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Abstract
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Uniquely among Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, Haiti has a largely non-public education 
system. Prior to the earthquake of January 2010, just 
19 percent of primary school students were enrolled in 
public schools, with the remainder enrolled in a mix of 
religious, for-profit, and non-governmental organization-
funded schools. This paper examines changes in Haitian 
schooling patterns in the last century and shows the 
country experienced tremendous growth in school 
attainment, driven almost entirely by growth in the 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Sector Unit and the Education Sector Unit in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to 
development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at gdemombynes@worldbank.org.  
private sector. Additionally, it provides evidence that the 
private market “works” to the extent that primary school 
fees are higher for schools with characteristics associated 
with education quality. The paper also analyzes the 
demand and supply determinants of school attendance 
and finds that household wealth is a major determinant 
of attendance. Given these findings, the authors conclude 
that in the near-term paying school fees for poor students 
may be an effective approach to expanding schooling 
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1. Introduction 
Even before the earthquake of January 2010, Haiti was the poorest country in the 
Western Hemisphere, with 78 percent of its citizens living on less than US$2 a day. The returns 
to schooling in the country are substantial, which suggests that education can offer Haitians the 
hope of moving out of poverty, but school is out of reach for many Haitian children
1. Three 
characteristics distinguish Haiti’s education system from others in the region: the low attendance 
rates for primary school, the fact that many primary school students are over-age for their grades, 
and the minor role played by the public sector. Only 83 percent of those ages 6-14 were 
attending school in 2005, with much lower attendance rates for the poor. While the mandated age 
for entering grade 1 is 6, the actual mean age is nearly 10, and students in grade 6 are on average 
almost 16, (i.e. five years older than expected).  Unlike in other countries in the region, schools 
in Haiti are operated chiefly by non-public organizations.
2 Foremost among these are religious 
groups, which account for 47 percent of primary schools. An additional 28 percent of schools are 
classified as “secular independent” (a category which includes those that are for profit) and a 
smaller number of schools are operated by community groups and other non-governmental 
organizations. To shed light on Haiti’s unusual education system, we examine the historical 
evolution of school attainment, the correlates of school attendance, the determinants of school 
fees, and the market structure of schooling.   
Since the 1930s, the relative share of public schools in Haiti has declined steadily over 
time, falling to just 8 percent of all primary schools in 2003. At the same time, the expansion of 
the non-public sector has increased education access. The primary completion rate grew from 35 
percent for Haitians born 1950-1954 to 88 percent for those born a generation later (1980-1984).  
Despite this progress, as of the most recent (2005) survey data, severe gaps between rich and 
poor remained. Primary attendance and completion rates for those in the wealthiest quintile are 
comparable to those of middle income countries in the region, while the rates for the poorest 
quintile are similar to those of the poorest countries in Africa. Another key feature of the Haitian 
education system is that many students are over the prescribed age for their grades. Multivariate 
analysis presented in this paper indicates that parents’ education, household composition, and 
                                                 
1 See World Bank (2006) for estimates of returns to schooling in Haiti based on 2001 survey data. Overall, the 
estimates for the marginal return from an additional year of education are 15.6-19.7 percent for wage earnings and 
14.0-17.2 percent for total earnings (including wages and self-employment earnings).  
2 In Haiti, all non-state providers of education are collectively referred to as the “non-public” sector. In this paper, 
the terms “private” and “non-public” are used interchangeably.   3
household wealth are significant correlates of attendance. We also show that the supply of 
schools and teachers is positively associated with attendance, while greater distance to schools 
and higher levels of school fees are associated with lower attendance.  
   The finding from the regression results that the poor are much less likely to attend school 
is compatible with the subjective responses of parents: 43 percent of families of children not 
attending school report that the major reason is cost.
3 Given these findings, we analyze the 
determinants of school fees and the market structure of the schooling system. Higher fees are 
associated with the presence of teaching-related infrastructure and higher teacher quality but are 
not associated with the presence of recreational facilities or a lower teacher-student ratio. We 
also find that schools with larger shares of the local educational market charge higher fees. 
A number of policy recommendations follow from our analysis. In the shorter run, given 
that poverty prevents families from sending their children to private schools in Haiti, 
scholarships or cash transfers can help increase attendance and provide incentives for timely 
enrollment into grade 1. Additionally, strengthening of the state’s role as regulator and ongoing 
efforts by the Ministry of Education to license rural schools would allow for better enforcement 
of a minimum quality of education.  
The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12
th 2010 has exacerbated the constraining 
factors on accessing schools. On the supply-side, an estimated 4,228 schools were severely 
damaged or destroyed, and approximately 1,350 teachers were killed (along with approximately 
38,000 students).  The Ministry of Education itself was largely destroyed.  On the demand side, 
the earthquake represents a significant reduction in the already low ability of households to pay 
for private schooling.
4 While the analysis presented here predates the earthquake, the conclusions 
and corresponding policy implications remain relevant, particularly considering the significant 
donor resources expected in the coming years for the education sector in Haiti, and the paucity of 
data to guide those investments. 
 
2. The Data 
  We draw mainly on the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the 2003 School 
Census. The DHS was carried out in Haiti in 1994-95, 2000, and 2005 and is representative at 
                                                 
3 World Bank (2006), based on analysis of the 2001 Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie en Haiti.  
4 See Government of Haiti (2010) and UNICEF (2010)   4
the national level, for urban and rural areas in the 10 departments of the country, and for the 
urban area of Port-au-Prince. Although the DHS surveys do not include income or consumption 
information, it is possible to use the asset data to construct a wealth index, which we employ as a 
measure of socioeconomic status.  
We complement the DHS with information from the 2003 School Census, which contains 
school-level information for all preschool, primary, and secondary schools in the country and 
includes information about whether each school is privately or publicly operated, the year the 
school was opened, and the fees charged.
 5 An infrastructure module contains data on access to 
public services and school facilities.
 Finally, the census includes characteristics of the teaching 
personnel: the number of principal and secondary teachers in each grade and the age, gender, and 
contract status of each teacher. To assess the relationship between school supply and attendance, 
data on the local availability of schools from the census is matched with household information 
from the DHS.
6 Households are matched with the aggregated indices of school supply at the 
level of geographic units defined by urban areas within each commune and (separately) rural 
areas within each commune.  
 
3. Historical Evolution of the Education Sector in Haiti. 
The dominant story in the twentieth century for Haitian education has been the anemic 
growth of the public school system and the explosive growth of the private school system 
beginning in the 1960s. Figure 1 shows the population of public and private schools by year from 
1930 onwards (based on schools that existed at the time of the 2003 school census), along with 
estimates of the national population since 1960.
7 Until the early 1960s, most schools in Haiti 
were public. Thereafter, the share of public schools among all schools declined dramatically, 
falling to 21 percent in 1980 and just 8 percent in 2003. The number of private schools grew 27-
fold between 1960 and 2003, far exceeding the growth of the population, which grew by a factor 
                                                 
5 The 1982 education reform (Reforme Bernard) introduced a basic education system with three cycles: grades 1-4, 
5-6, and 7-9.  In the census, the first two cycles make up “primary” education, with secondary education beginning 
at grade 7 and continuing through until grade 12. 
6 Haiti is divided into 10 departments, 41 arrondissements, 133 communes, and about 477 sections communales. We 
match the DHS surveys to the School Census at the level of commune because it is the lowest level for which there 
are geographical identifiers in the DHS. 
7 The numbers underlying this figure were generated using information on year of founding of the school, among 
schools that still existed at the time of the 2003 school census. Consequently, to the extent that public and private 
schools close at different rates—and it is likely that a private school is more likely to close than a public school in 
any give year—the true population of schools at any given point will differ from that shown here.   5
of 2.4. The public system continued to expand slowly but with a growth rate below that of the 
population. 
The period of abject relative decline of the public school system corresponds closely with 
the reign of the dictator François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who came to power in 1957. After his 
son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier took over in 1971, the public system continued to 
stagnate, but the growth rate of non-public schools accelerated, in part due to a rule instituted by 
Baby Doc that religious missionaries were required to build an affiliated school with any new 
church.
 8  The expansion of private schools increased further in the late 1980s, after the end of 
the repressive Duvalier regime in 1986. The years 1994-1999 were a peak period for school 
construction. This coincides with the first democratic transition, a period of relative political 
stability, and a national campaign to promote the importance of education. The period was also 
marked by large investments in social sectors from external aid funds.  
As of the 2003 school census, 92 percent of Haitian schools were private, accounting for 
more than 80 percent of school enrollment, as shown in Table 1. Of the 15,223 schools in the 
country, 33 percent were in urban areas. Fifty-four percent of schools were “multigrade,” i.e. had 
more than one grade in the same classroom. Although this policy has emerged out of necessity 
due to the limited number of classrooms and teachers, it may contribute to poor student 
performance, due to the low time of attention that every teacher has to give to the students.  The 
School Census also shows that in 2003 only 8 percent of private schools functioned with a 
license, a government credential which certifies that minimum facility and quality standards are 
met. The difference in licensing between urban and rural areas reinforces the geographical 
differences in schooling: 17 percent of the schools located in urban areas are licensed, compared 
to only 3 percent of rural schools.  This may also be a reflection of the Ministry of Education’s 
weak presence outside of Haiti’s urban areas. 
To understand the broad evolution of the Haitian education system over time, we 
examine the schooling attainment levels of Haitians from three birth cohorts: 1950-54, 1965-69, 
and 1980-84.  Students in the first cohort were of primary school age in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, a period marked by Papa Doc’s arrival. The second cohort reached primary age in the first 
years of rule of Baby Doc. The third cohort entered primary school in the years after Baby Doc 
was overthrown by a popular uprising in 1986. The period 1994 to 2000 was characterized by 
                                                 
8 Fass (1988) provides a history of the growth of schools in Haiti.   6
relative political stability as a peaceful democratic transition took place from Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide to René Préval.   
Although schooling levels in Haiti today remain low, school attainment improved 
substantially during the last half-century. Among those born 1950-1954, only 35 percent 
completed even one year of education and just 10 percent finished primary school. Completed 
schooling levels are much higher among those in later cohorts. The proportion of people who 
attended at least some school increased to 61 percent for those born 1965-1969, and 88 percent 
for those born 1980-1984.  
A useful way to visualize differences in school attainment by group and changes by 
cohorts is through survival plots, which indicate the percentage of people who completed at least 
each level of education. Figure 2 presents these survival estimates using the DHS data from 2005 
for our three cohorts. The figure shows a large improvement between our first two cohorts, 
chiefly in primary education (up to six years of education.). The fraction who completed at least 
first grade increased by 26 percentage points between the 1950-1954 and 1965-1969 cohorts, but 
primary school dropout rates remained high, as can be seen by the steep decline of the survival 
curve over the first few years of schooling. Among those in the second cohort (born 1965-69), 
only one-third finished primary education. In contrast, in the most recent cohort (born 1980-84), 
two-thirds completed primary education.  Despite the poor state of Haiti’s education system, 
primary enrollment has taken great strides since the 1950s.                  
Two relatively sharp drop-offs—following fifth grade and sixth grade—are visible in the 
profiles for the most recent cohort. The drop-off following sixth grade is common to many 
countries, corresponding to the transition from primary to secondary. However, the sharp decline 
after fifth grade is unusual. In the Haitian school system, at the end of the sixth grade, students 
have the option of taking a national exam. Passing this national exam permits the student to 
continue to secondary education. Two possibilities exist to explain the drop-off after fifth grade 
in the data. If the sixth grade education is largely focused on the exam and the value of 
completing sixth grade without taking the exam is low, students not intending to take the exam 
may be more inclined to drop out in fifth grade. An alternative possibility is that students who 
completed sixth grade but failed the national exam may not consider themselves having 
“completed” sixth grade and might report fifth grade as their highest grade completed when 
reporting their education level in the DHS.    7
Survival plots for educational attainment by gender (Figure 3) show that the gender gap 
in access to education has closed over time. Only 27 percent of women born in the early 1950s 
received any education, versus 44 percent of men, and increases in education attainment between 
the first two cohorts were concentrated among men. Between the second and third cohorts, 
however, large gains were made for girls, so that for those born 1980-84, there are only small 
differences between the attainment profile of girls and boys in the first years of primary school. 
After fifth grade, however, attainment falls much more rapidly for girls than for boys. 
Figure 4 shows the differences between quintiles of socioeconomic status, as measured 
by a wealth index.
9 It is important to note that because these curves are based on household 
wealth levels in 2005 (and not when the individuals were children), they reflect in part the effect 
of education on wealth levels. Despite progress, education attainment levels for the poorest 
Haitians are still exceedingly low. Only 30 percent of those in the poorest quintile born 1980-
1984 completed primary education, and just 12 percent completed secondary school. For those in 
the same cohort in the top quintile, 89 percent completed primary school, and 75 percent 
secondary school. The figures for the top quintile compare favorably to the average attainment in 
wealthier countries of the region like Colombia, where in the cohort born 1976-85, 77 percent 
completed primary school. In contrast, the survival rates for those in the poorest quintile in Haiti 
are comparable to those of a poor sub-Saharan African country like Rwanda, where only 32 
percent in the same cohort completed primary education.
10 
This analysis is based on the education attainment of people living in Haiti in 2005. 
Consequently, the attainment profiles may differ from those of that of the original cohort. The 
fact that the less educated probably have lower life expectancy, and thus lower likelihood of 
surviving through 2005, means that the education levels shown here are probably biased upwards 
relative to those of the original cohort, particularly for the oldest generations. This would suggest 
that the increase in education attainments that has taken place over time is even greater than what 
this analysis suggests.  
The effect of migration is harder to assess. The population of Haitians living in the 
United States was 420,000 in 2000, according to U.S. Census data, and very rough estimates 
                                                 
9 The wealth index was constructed using the approach of Filmer and Prichett (2001). The wealth index was 
generated using the pooled dataset with all three survey years. The coefficients of the wealth index can be found in 
Table A.4 in the appendix. 
10 The figures for Colombia and Rwanda are based on calculations from the 2005 DHS surveys.    8
suggest that a half million Haitians live in the Dominican Republic. Given a total population for 
Haiti of 9.5 million in 2005 (based on an adjusted figure from the country’s 2003 National 
Census), this means that roughly 10 percent of the Haitian-born population lives abroad. It is 
unclear, however, in what direction this biases the figures presented here.  
  
4. Determinants of School Attendance 
  In this section we switch from examining the long-run historical evolution of school 
attainment to consider the more recent story of school attendance. Figure 5 summarizes 
attendance rates by age, based on children observed in the 1994, 2000, and 2005 DHS. 
Substantial increases in attendance rates between 1994 and 2000 are evident at every age, and 
overall the primary attendance rate (for children 6-14) increased from 73.6 to 86 percent between 
those two years. The years 2000-05 registered a slight decline in primary school attendance, to 
83.4 percent. Table 2 shows attendance rates disaggregated by area of residence and gender. The 
rural-urban gap in attendance rates diminished greatly between 1994 and 2000 but was still 11 
percentage points in 2005. The gender gap in schooling reversed in the most recent survey, so 
that there were more girls than boys attending school in 2005. This phenomenon follows the 
recent trends in the Central American and Caribbean region as whole, where girls have higher 
attendance rates, lower dropout, and better overall performance.  
The large expansion of school supply during the late 1990s appears to have narrowed the 
gap between rich and poor in school attendance. Figure 6 shows the attendance rates for the 
years 1994, 2000 and 2005, by quintiles of a wealth index. From 1994 to 2000 the attendance 
rates for the poorest quintile increased from 51 percent to 71 percent, while the attendance rates 
increased only slightly for the richest quintile. Gaps, however, persist: in 2005 67 percent of 
children in the poorest quintile attended school compared to 95 percent of the children in the top 
quintile. 
In Figure 8, we disaggregate the attendance figures by preschool, primary, and secondary 
for 2000 and 2005.
11 This figure reveals an important aspect of Haitian education: a very large 
number of students are “over-age” for their school level. In 2005, a large proportion of older 
children were attending preschool: 33 percent of children age 8, 17 percent age 10, and 8 percent 
                                                 
11 The 1994 data is excluded from this analysis because the 1994 survey did not capture complete information on the 
level and grade of students attending school.   9
of those age 12. Likewise, 57 percent of 16 year olds and almost one-third of 18 year olds were 
attending primary school. The magnitude of the over-age problem in the Haitian educational 
system is also evident from the average age of children attending each grade, shown in Table 5. 
The average age of children attending first grade is almost 10, while the official age of entry is 
six. The problem is substantially more severe in rural areas, where the average age of attendance 
in grade one is 10.3, versus 8.9 in urban areas. At the end of primary school, sixth-grade students 
are on average almost 16, five years older than the prescribed age for the grade. 
The existence of a large number of students who are over the normal age for their grades 
is a concern because their presence in the classroom may negatively affect other students. 
Evidence from other countries suggests that age heterogeneity in the classroom may decrease 
learning (Schiefelbein, 1975 and Schiefelbein and Wolff, 1992). Teachers with multiage 
classrooms face the challenge of adapting teaching methods to satisfy the interests and attention 
needs of children of different age groups at the same time.  
The presence of over-age children can be driven by a mix of three causes: 1) late entrance 
to the school system, 2) grade repetition, and 3) dropping out of school and restarting the same 
grade when older.  The fact that attendance rates increase with age over a substantial range 
suggests that the over-age phenomenon in Haiti is driven chiefly by late entrance to school. As 
Figure 7 shows, in 2005 attendance rates grew markedly moving from age 6 to 10, and the peak 
attendance rate was at age 14. We would not expect to see this pattern if the presence of over-age 
children were largely a result of grade repetition or dropping out and restarting school.  
The slight decrease in attendance between 2000 and 2005 occurred during a time of 
political turmoil and economic decline.  During this time international support from the United 
States, Canada, and other important donors was suspended, with international aid dropping to 
US$136 million in 2001-02 from a high of US$611 million in 1994-95.
12 Vulnerable populations 
tend to draw their children out of schools during an economic downturn, as a coping mechanism 
during periods of crisis (World Bank, 2007a). Civil unrest during this time also tended to 
disproportionately affect urban slums and other poor areas. This effect can be seen in the 
decrease in the attendance rates in this period for the three poorest quintiles, while for children in 
the two top quintiles attendance remained steady. 
                                                 
12 See Government of Haiti (2004).   10
  Next we consider the determinants of school attendance in a multivariate framework. We 
model school attendance and progress in a simple household demand model where schooling is a 
function of individual characteristics, household characteristics, demographic factors, locality 
characteristics and the availability of school services. Our reduced form model to be estimated is 
as follows: 
ijt t jt jt ijt ijt ijt Y S Z H X Sch               5 4 3 2 1       ,         (1) 
 where Schijt represents school attendance of individual i in the locality j, at time t; Xitj is a vector 
of individual characteristics,  Hijt represents a vector of household characteristics that affect 
schooling decisions, and Zjt is a vector of local characteristics. We include a dummy variable 
which indicates whether the household is in an urban or rural area, and the mean of the wealth 
index of households in the cluster.
13 Additionally, Sjt is a vector of characteristics of local school 
characteristics, and Yt is a survey year dummy variables. Finally, ijt is a random error term. We 
estimate the model using probit regressions. We follow convention in the literature and refer to 
the variables in the analysis as “determinants” of school attendance and refer to the estimates as 
indicating the “effects” of such variables. However, in the absence of an identification strategy, 
these results should be more modestly understood as conditional correlations which suggest but 
do not conclusively demonstrate causal relationships. 
The first three columns of Table 3 show probit results for each of the three survey years 
separately, while the last column shows results for the three years pooled. A Chow test of 
structural change rejects the null hypothesis of stable coefficients over the three years. 
Nonetheless, given the general similarity in the coefficients across years, we focus on the pooled 
sample results. The results for individual characteristics mirror the bivariate results presented 
earlier. As noted, the gender gap in education has closed over time. This is reflected in the 
coefficients of the gender variable for the regressions for the three years for which we have 
available information. In 1994, boys had a 2.4 percent higher probability of attending school, 
controlling for other factors. In 2000 there was no gender difference in attendance rates. By 
2005, the gender gap had reversed, and girls had a 1.3 percent higher chance of going to school 
than boys.  
                                                 
13 In this case, the lowest level of geographical identifier that we have in the DHS data is the cluster, so we take the 
average of the wealth index for each of these units. To avoid the endogeneity of this variable, following Lanjouw 
and Ravallion (1999), we calculate the left out mean, i.e. generating the average of the wealth index in the 
household’s cluster, but leaving out the value of the wealth index for that household.   11
The probability of a child attending school is positively associated with the household’s 
education and wealth levels. One additional year of education of the most educated person in the 
household is associated with a 1.3 percent increase in the probability of school attendance. An 
increase in one point in the wealth index is associated with a 2.3 percent increase in the 
probability of an individual attending school.
14 We also include a dummy variable indicating if 
both parents are permanently living in the household. Children that grow up in households where 
both parents are present are 9.5 percent more likely to attend school.  
Neither urban dummy nor the average value of the wealth index at the cluster level 
appears as a statistically significant determinant of school attendance, once observed household 
and individual characteristics are controlled for.
15 This result suggests that the simple correlation 
between attendance and urban residence reflects individual and household characteristics rather 
than an overall area effect.
16  
To assess the relationship of school supply with attendance we use the 2003 school 
census, merged with each round of the DHS, only considering the schools that appear to be 
founded on or before the year in which the survey was taken. We consider a set of variables that 
approximate the school supply in several dimensions: number of schools, number of classes, 
total number of teachers, and number of trained teachers. All the variables are divided by the 
number of children in school age in the locality.
17 These variables are intended to account for 
both the availability of schools and teachers as well as the quality of the teachers. Additionally, 
we include in our regressions the average fees charged by schools in the locality. Finally, from 
the community module in the 1994 and 2000 DHS, we include information on the average time 
to travel from a central point in the cluster to a primary school. 
Table 4 shows results from the analysis of school determinants taking into account school 
supply variables. The availability of schools in the urban/rural commune (both in terms of the 
number of schools and classes) is positively associated with the probability of attending school. 
A greater number of teachers is associated with a higher probability of school attendance, 
                                                 
14 The standard deviation of the wealth index is 1.96. 
15 In order to reduce endogeneity problems with this variable, we use the left out mean for every household. 
16 Table A.5 and Table A.6 in the appendix show the results from Table 3, run separately for urban and for rural 
areas. 
17 The population of school age is defined as the number between 5 and 19 years old who lived in the urban/rural 
area of the commune at the time of the 2003 population census.   12
although the number of trained teachers is not.
18 As the time needed to travel to the closest 
school increases, the probability of children going to school significantly decreases. Finally, a 
higher average fee charged by schools in the community is associated with lower school 
attendance. This finding matches the subjective responses of parents: in a 2001 survey, 43 




5. Determinants of School Fees and the Educational Market in Haiti 
 
Given the apparent importance of fees as a barrier to attendance, we next consider their 
determinants, using data on the fees charged by each school from the 2003 School Census.
20 To 
the extent that the fees are determined in a competitive education market, they reflect families’ 
willingness-to-pay, so that the correlates of fees provide an indication of what characteristics the 
families of children value when choosing schools. We examine school fees using the following 
regression framework: 
12 34 5 log( )ij ij ij ij ij j j ij fee I A T C H                    ,                                     (3) 
where our dependent variable is the logarithm of fees charged by school i in locality j. A locality 
is defined as the urban or rural portion of a commune, Iij is a vector of variables for school i’s 
infrastructure, Aij is a vector of administrative characteristics of the school, and Tij is a vector of 
variables related to teacher supply and quality in the school. We measure market concentration 
                                                 
18 We define a teacher to be trained if he or she is reported to have a university degree or teaching training certificate 
(reported in French as universitaire, normalien, or capiste). 
19 World Bank (2006), based on analysis of the 2001 Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie en Haiti.  
20 The descriptive statistics for this data are shown in Table A.7 in the appendix.   13
by calculating the adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
21 for every section communale, denoted 
by  Hj. The portion of the local market owned by school i in the section communale  j is 
represented by Cij.
22 The termj captures a fixed effect at the locality level, and j is a random 
error term at the school level.
23 
  Regression results are presented in Table 6. Column (1) presents the results for the basic 
specification including school characteristics and controls for the size of potential demand in the 
section communale, as measured by the number of students in school age. Coefficients on almost 
all of the school characteristics plausibly linked to the quality of education are statistically 
significant with the expected signs. Schools with greater access to services (electricity, 
bathrooms, latrines), as well as those with smaller class sizes, and more teaching materials 
(chairs, tables, offices, etc.) have higher fees. On the other hand, the presence of recreation areas, 
sports areas, and a kitchen is not associated with any difference in fees. Overall, assuming that 
the fees reflect willingness to pay, these patterns suggest that families value characteristics that 
are generally associated with higher quality education. 
Administrative characteristics of the school also impact fees. In particular, schools with 
management committees and those that are licensed by the Ministry of Education charge higher 
fees. On the other hand, the number of shifts offered by the school, having a preschool, and 
having a parents’ committee do not have a significant association with fees. We also consider 
how teachers’ characteristics are associated with fees. The number of teachers per student has no 
                                                 
21 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration that is computed as the sum of the 








2, where si is the market share of firm (school) i in the market, and 
n is the number of schools. The HHI captures the relative size and distribution of the firms in the market and 
approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of firms of relatively equal size. The HHI increases both 
as the number of firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases. We use the 










 , where again, n is the number of firms in the market, and H is the usual Herfindahl Index, as 
above. 
  
22 As a measure of the market power of school i, in this case, we use the square of the share of the market owned by 
each school. The share of the market is defined as the ratio of the number of students enrolled in the school over the 
number of students enrolled in any school in the area. 
23 The fixed effects are calculated at the higher locality (i.e urban/rural commune) level rather than at the lower 
section communale level so that variation by section communale can be used to examine the relationship of fees with 
the market share variables.   14
statistically significant association with the level of fees. However, fees are higher in schools in 
which a greater proportion of the teachers have undergone teacher training. 
Column (2) and subsequent columns include fixed effects at the locality level. Overall, 
comparing columns one and two, we see that results are broadly similar with locality fixed 
effects, though the magnitude of most coefficients is reduced. 
The interpretation of the coefficient as a reflection of willingness-to-pay relies on the 
assumption that prices are determined in a competitive market. There are two substantial reasons 
this may be an inadequate approximation of the education market in Haiti. First, as noted earlier, 
private schools are provided largely by a mix of secular and independent groups, community 
groups, and religious groups. Pricing by non-profit institutions might be determined by factors 
other than market forces. The regression results do show that average prices do vary 
systematically by school type. Controlling for observed characteristics, in the specification with 
locality effects (column 2), fees charged by schools run by independent/secular groups are 21 
percent higher than those run by religious groups (the omitted group). The same specification 
shows that schools managed by community groups charge fees that are 15 percent lower than 
those run by religious groups. We also run separate regressions for the three types of schools. 
(These are shown in Table A.8 in the annex.) Although magnitudes vary somewhat across school 
type, the overall patterns are remarkably similar to those from the analysis pooling all schools. 
This provides rough evidence that despite the non-profit orientation of community and religious 
groups, their prices may reflect the same competitive pressures which affect secular/independent 
schools.   
A second reason school fees might not perfectly reflect willingness-to-pay is that the 
education market may be characterized by monopolistic competition. If this is the case, schools 
will price above the marginal cost, meaning higher fees conditional on school characteristics. In 
a very concentrated market, schools at the high end of the market may behave as market leaders, 
setting the price as monopolists, so that smaller schools behave as price takers. To consider these 
possibilities, the specifications Columns (3) through (5) include the adjusted Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, which is a measure of market concentration at the section communale level 
along with a measure of the market power of each school. 
  The coefficient on the adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is not statistically significant 
(column 3 specification), which indicates that we do find evidence of monopolistic competition   15
in local educational markets. We do find, however, that schools with a larger share of the local 
school market have higher fees (column 4 specification). These results hold even after 
controlling for the concentration of the local market by including both the school’s market power 
and the market concentration variables (column 5 specification). Although we do not have a full 
explanation for this result, it may reflect a segmented local market structure in which a leading 
school sets the price as a monopolist, and other schools in the market compete among 




  During the past century there has been a major expansion of the non-public school system 
in Haiti. With this growth, school attainment has advanced, and the large gender gap in schooling 
has closed. Nonetheless, severe gaps in school attainment persist between urban and rural areas 
and between the poor and the better off.   Our analysis suggests that among the many 
obstacles to school attendance, poverty was a key barrier before the earthquake, a situation that 
has likely worsened since.  The multivariate analysis of the determinants of school attendance 
suggests that among the most important determinants of schooling are the education of the 
parents, the structure of the household (single parents, number of siblings), and the 
socioeconomic level of the household.  An  important aspect of the Haitian educational 
system is that a large fraction of students are over the prescribed age for their grades. 
Investigating further on this issue, we find that the over-age phenomenon appears to be driven by 
late entrance to school rather than repetition or drop-out and reentrance to school.  
  Recognizing that fees are a major barrier to school attendance for many Haitians, we 
investigate their determinants. We find that factors associated with higher education quality and 
teacher quality (as measured by the proportion of qualified teachers) are associated with higher 
fees while recreational facilities and the student-teacher ratio do not have any statistically 
significant association with fees. We also find that licensed schools and those with management 
committees charge premiums, while schools managed by institutions that presumably have 
altruistic motives (religious and community groups) charge lower fees than secular and 
independent schools. While we do not find evidence of monopolistic competition in the 
schooling market, we do find that schools with a larger share of the market charge more.   16
  Overall, the evidence shows that achieving universal school attendance requires attacking 
the underlying economic factors that constrain families from sending their children to school. On 
the demand-side, this might include financial incentives and/or public information campaigns 
informing families of the benefits to enrolling children into grade one at the prescribed age (six 
or seven years old). The government’s ongoing efforts to finance tuition fees in private schools 
for families sending their children to first grade on time would be one good candidate for 
expansion.  A program of school fee financing would provide more and more predictable 
financing for schools.  
In the long run, increasing the supply of schools (with a focus on rural areas, in addition 
to the reconstruction of schools in Port-au-Prince, Leogane, and other densely populated 
earthquake-affected areas) would address the attendance and on-time attendance issues, as well 
as facilitate access for the poorest children. However, given the highly dispersed nature of the 
rural population, the expansion of education supply in those remote, hard-to-reach areas would 
likely require a differentiated approach to that of urban or peri-urban areas.  For instance, the 
recommendation in the Government’s Strategie Nationale d’Action/Education Pour Tous calling 
for partial, multi-grade schools with few classrooms could be a quicker, more cost-effective 
approach to providing basic education services to those most in need.  This would likely require 
a community-based approach, given the historic low capacity of the public sector (further 
weakened by the earthquake), and the dearth of entrepreneurs and capital in these areas.   
The analysis has shown that parents value (pay more) for school characteristics 
associated with quality education: trained teachers, and licensed schools.  Aside from financing 
the provision of education through private actors, the government needs to create the enabling 
environment for accelerated teacher training. Ongoing efforts by the Ministry of Education to 
license non-public schools should also be intensified. This strengthening of the state’s role as 
regulator would allow for more enforcement of a minimum quality of education. Over time, as 
the education system recovers from the earthquake (e.g. the supply of trained teachers and the 
capacity of Ministry of Education inspectors and engineers to conduct infrastructural audits 
grows), the minimum standards for receiving accreditation could be raised.   Enhancing the 
quality of schools in this way may also stimulate higher attendance rates. 
The challenges and policy recommendations outlined here are not specific to the post-
earthquake environment.  The main differences now are the degree of urgency in addressing   17
these issues and the scale of resources available for investing in the sector.  A well-guided 
response by the international community, together with local policymakers, could put Haiti on a 
virtuous cycle of improved education quality and increased educational achievement, thereby 
enhancing human development outcomes and reducing poverty.     18
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Figure 1: Number of Public and Private Schools and National Population by Year 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Haiti 2003 School Census data (schools) and World Development Indicators 
(population 1960-2003). Population for 1950 is from a Haitian census estimate published in Dyer (1954) 
and the population before 1950 is estimated using a linear extrapolation based on an estimate of the 
population in 1914 found in Perusek (1984) The counts of public and private schools are based on the year 
of founding of schools as reported in the 2003 School Census. Schools that no longer existed at the time of 


















































Figure 2: Survival Plots for Education Attainment by Birth Cohort 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using data from the 2005 DHS. 
Note: These are plots of Kaplan-Meier survivor functions. The plots indicate the proportion of individuals 
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Source: Authors’ analysis using data from the 2005 DHS. 
Note: These are plots of Kaplan-Meier survivor functions. The plots indicate the proportion of individuals in each birth cohort who achieved at least the indicated 
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Source: Authors’ analysis using data from the 2005 DHS. 
Note: These are plots of Kaplan-Meier survivor functions. The plots indicate the proportion of individuals in each birth cohort who achieved at least the indicated 
number of years of education. Quintiles are calculated using an wealth index. Because the wealth index is calculated using the individual’s household 
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Figure 5: Percent of Population Attending School By Age 1994, 2000, and 2005 
 
Source: DHS 1994/95, 2000, and 2005.  
 
Figure 6: School Attendance by Quintiles of the Wealth Index  
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Public 8%  -  -    8%  9% 
Urban 32%  32%  37%  -  -   
School has management committee  60%  59%  80%  59%  64% 
School has parent committee  65%  63%  84%  70%  54% 
School has license  7%  8%  3%  3%  17% 
School has school feeding program  14%  12%  35%  13%  15% 
School has multigrade classrooms  54%  57%  26%  60%  42% 
Mean number of classrooms  4.23  3.99  6.84  3.6  5.55 
Mean number of teachers 4.16  3.92  6.64 3.45 5.61 
Average age of teachers in school 32  31 40  32  33 
% of teachers trained  14%  11%  38%  7%  27% 
% of teachers who are men 69%  70%  56%  74%  59% 
Students per teacher  31 30 47  32  30 
Class size (number of students per class)  33 31 48  33  31 
Average annual fees (Haitian gourdes) 777  777  -  458  1469 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Haiti 2003 school census data. 
 
Table 2:  School Attendance Rates 
 
  % of children ages 6-14 attending school 
 1994/95  2000  2005 
Panel A: School attendance, by area of residence 
Rural 67%  83%  80% 
Urban 86%  93%  91% 
Panel B: School attendance, by gender 
Girls 74%  87%  85% 
Boys 74%  85%  82% 
All children 6-14  74%  86%  83% 
 
Source: Author's analysis using DHS data. 
Note: The school attendance rate is defined as the percentage of children ages 6-14 attending 
pre-school, primary, or secondary school. 
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Table 3: Determinants of School Attendance 
 
  Dependent variable: School attendance 
 
1994 2000 2005  All  years 
pooled 
Gender (1=male)  0.024  0.001  -0.013  0.000 
  (0.012)** (0.006) (0.006)** (0.004) 
Age  0.120 0.091 0.070 0.088 
  (0.019)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** 
Age  squared  -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Both parents at home dummy  0.204  0.109  0.050  0.095 
  (0.020)*** (0.012)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Number  of  of  household  members  -0.011 -0.006 -0.013 -0.010 
  (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Maximum years of education 
completed in the household 
0.015 0.009 0.016 0.013 
(0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Wealth  index  0.042 0.026 0.014 0.023 
(0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** 
Average wealth index for cluster  0.017  -0.005  0.008  0.005 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Urban dummy  -0.057  0.009  -0.003  -0.006 
  (0.036) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) 
Year=2000      0.065 
      (0.009)*** 
Year=2005      0.071 
      (0.010)*** 
Mean value of dependent variable  0.795  0.876  0.865  0.855 
Chow test for difference in coefficients 
across regressions 
Chi
2 (18) = 136.92   Prob>Chi
2 =0.000   
Observations  5633  10578 10790 27001 
Pseudo  R-sq  0.15 0.09 0.12 0.11 
Regressions are computed for children between 6 and 14 years old. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
cluster level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: Mean values of the dependent variable differ from the attendance rates shown in Table 2 because 
the regressions do not include observations with missing values of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 4: School Attendance and the Characteristics of the School Supply 
 
 Dependent  variable: School attendance 
Gender (1=male)  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.009 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Age  0.087 0.087  0.088  0.088  0.088  0.100 
  (0.007)*** (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.009)*** 
Age squared  -0.004 -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Both parents at home dummy  0.097 0.096  0.096  0.095  0.095  0.140 
  (0.007)*** (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.011)*** 
Number of of household members  -0.009 -0.009  -0.009  -0.010  -0.010  -0.007 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Maximum years of education completed in 
the household 
 
0.013 0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.011 
(0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Wealth index 
 
0.023 0.023  0.023  0.023  0.023  0.032 
(0.003)*** (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
Average wealth index for cluster 
 
0.007  0.006  0.006  0.006 0.009 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)**  (0.006) 
Urban dummy  -0.012 -0.013  -0.013  -0.003  -0.001  -0.009 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
# schools per school-age children in area 
population 3.987           
 (1.121)***           
# classes per school-age children in area 
population   0.491         
   (0.191)**         
# teachers per school-age children in area 
population     0.432       
     (0.199)**       
# trained teachers per school-age children 
in area population        -0.495     
       (0.382)     
Log(Average annual fees in area)          -0.012   
         (0.006)**   
Travel time to closest school (minutes)            -0.001 
           (0.000)*** 
Year=2000  0.057 0.062  0.062  0.065  0.062  0.070 
  (0.009)*** (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.011)*** 
Year=2005  0.063 0.068  0.068  0.071  0.068   
 (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.010)***  (0.010)***   
Observations 26871  26966  26966  26966  27001  16211 
Pseudo R-sq  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.13 
Robust standard errors clustered at the cluster level in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Table 5: Average Age of Children Attending by Primary School 
Grade 
 
Grade Rural Urban  National 
1 10.3  8.9  9.8 
2 11.9  10.8  11.6 
3 13.3  12.0  12.8 
4 14.3  12.8  13.6 
5 15.7  14.3  15.1 
6 16.5  15.3  15.9 
Source: Author's analysis using data from the 2005 DHS. 
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Table 6: Determinants of School Fees 
 Dependent variable.: log(average school fees)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
School infrastructure   
School has a library 0.091 0.084 0.084 0.084  0.083
 (0.037)** (0.035)** (0.035)**  (0.035)** (0.035)**
School has an office for the 
principal 
0.255 0.170 0.171 0.168 0.168
(0.030)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)***  (0.024)*** (0.025)***
# of offices per teacher 0.058 0.048 0.047 0.047  0.046
  (0.029)** (0.026)* (0.026)* (0.026)* (0.026)*
# of tables per teacher 0.178 0.158 0.158 0.158  0.158
 (0.025)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)***  (0.021)*** (0.021)***
# of chairs per teacher 0.080 0.090 0.091 0.091  0.091
  (0.023)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)***  (0.020)*** (0.020)***
Class size (# students per class) -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
  (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)***
School has kitchen  -0.003 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.037
  (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
School has electricity 0.362 0.188 0.187 0.188  0.188
 (0.047)*** (0.039)*** (0.039)***  (0.038)*** (0.038)***
School has latrine  0.212 0.142 0.143 0.142 0.140
  (0.033)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)***  (0.030)*** (0.031)***
School has bathrooms  0.197 0.191 0.192 0.191  0.192
  (0.031)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)***  (0.028)*** (0.029)***
School has sports areas  0.030 0.051 0.051 0.050  0.049
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
School has recreation areas  -0.053 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
  (0.038) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
School administrative quality   
School has preschool 0.087 0.029 0.029 0.029  0.029
  (0.037)** (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Number of shifts available  0.072 -0.041 -0.040 -0.042 -0.042
  (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
School has management committee  0.132 0.115 0.114 0.113  0.112
 (0.029)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)***  (0.027)*** (0.027)***
Scholl has parent committee  -0.102 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
  (0.033)*** (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
School has a license  0.329 0.273 0.274 0.274 0.274
  (0.039)*** (0.045)*** (0.045)***  (0.046)*** (0.046)***
School is managed by an 
independent/secular group 
0.259 0.211 0.210 0.210 0.211
(0.030)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)***
School is managed by a 
community group 
-0.132 -0.149 -0.149 -0.149 -0.149
(0.046)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)***  (0.034)*** (0.034)***
Teachers' characteristics   
Teacher-student ratio  0.185 -0.039 -0.032 -0.032 -0.012
  (0.451) (0.370) (0.370) (0.372) (0.371)
% of teachers trained 0.434 0.292 0.292 0.291  0.292
  (0.058)*** (0.042)*** (0.042)***  (0.042)*** (0.042)***
Market size and concentration   
log(# of students in the section   
communale) 
0.211 0.074 0.078 0.094 0.092
(0.017)*** (0.034)** (0.042)* (0.038)** (0.045)**
Adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman  0.012   -0.151
 (0.514)   (0.504)
Square of the share of the local 
market controlled by the school 
0.777 1.246
(0.351)** (0.508)**
Constant 3.440 4.783 4.749 4.615  4.634
  (0.161)*** (0.300)*** (0.381)***  (0.337)*** (0.399)***
Commune/urban dummies  No Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 11505 11505 11498 11505 11498
Number of commune/urban  261 261 261  261
R-squared (overall) 0.41 0.41 0.42  0.42
R-squared (within)  0.44 0.15 0.15 0.15  0.15
R-squared (between) 0.49 0.49 0.48  0.46
 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Robust standard errors clustered at the commune/urban level in parentheses.* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%   31
APPENDIX 
 
Table A. 1: Detail on the Owners of Schools in Haiti 
 
Category Frequency  Percent 
Public 1,240  8% 
Secular independent  4,225  28% 
Congregation 783  5% 
Community   674  4% 
Communitarian 1,806  12% 
Presbyterian 885  6% 
Protestant (Independent)  2,669  18% 
Protestant (Mission)  2,765  18% 
Others 176  1% 
Total 15,223  100 
      Source: Authors’ analysis of 2003 School Census.  
 
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics for School Attendance  
Children in School Age (6-14) 
 
   Pooled 
   Obs  Mean  s.d.  Min  Max 
School attendance  29497 0.82  0.38  0.00  1.00 
=1 if child attends school over-aged  16787 0.75  0.43  0.00  1.00 
Gender (1=male)  29552  0.50  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Age 29552  9.92  2.57  6.00  14.00 
Age squared  29552  104.97  51.40  36.00  196.00 
Both parents at home  29552  0.63  0.48  0.00  1.00 
Maximum years of education completed in 
the HH  27186  6.23  3.81  0.00  21.00 
# of household members  29552  6.84  2.66  1.00  27.00 
Wealth index  29415 -0.16  1.96  -2.53  6.35 
Average wealth index for cluster  29415 -0.20  1.65  -2.51  4.47 
Urban 29552  0.34  0.47  0.00  1.00 
# schools per pop in school age  29421  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 
# Classes per pop in school age  29517  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.28 
# of teachers per pop in school age 29517  0.02  0.02 0.00 0.31 
# of trained teachers per pop in school age  29517  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09 
Log(Average annual fees)  29552  5.97  0.91  0.00  7.75 
Travel time to the closest school  17901  10.96  43.19  0.00  420.00 
year==  1994  29552  0.21  0.41  0.00  1.00 
year==  2000  29552  0.39  0.49  0.00  1.00 
year==  2005  29552  0.40  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Source: Author's analysis using data from three rounds of the DHS survey merged with 2003 School 
Census.   32
Table A.3: 
Descriptive Statistics for Children in School Age (6-14) in Each Survey 
 
   1994  2000  2005 
    Obs  Mean s.d.  Min Max  Obs  Mean s.d. Min  Max  Obs  Mean s.d.  Min  Max 
School attendance  6009 0.74  0.44  0.00  1.00 11849 0.86  0.35  0.00 1.00 11639 0.83  0.37 0.00 1.00 
=1 if child attends school over-aged  4484 0.75  0.43  0.00  1.00 6521 0.73  0.44 0.00 1.00 5782  0.78  0.42 0.00 1.00 
Gender (1=male)  6049 0.49  0.50  0.00  1.00 11852 0.50  0.50  0.00 1.00 11651 0.50  0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age  6049  9.89  2.57  6.00  14.00 11852 9.91  2.58  6.00 14.00 11651  9.94  2.56  6.00 14.00 
Age squared  6049 104.32  51.26  36.00  196.00 11852 104.92  51.69 36.00  196.00  11651 105.38 51.18 36.00  196.00 
Both parents at home  6049 0.75  0.43  0.00  1.00 11852 0.77  0.42  0.00 1.00 11651 0.42  0.49 0.00 1.00 
Maximum years of education 
completed in the HH  5688  5.56  3.89  0.00  17.00 10644 6.11  3.63  0.00 21.00 10854  6.71  3.87  0.00 17.00 
# of household members  6049  7.25  2.92  2.00  25.00 11852 6.80  2.56  2.00 21.00 11651  6.65  2.59  1.00 27.00 
Wealth index  6034 -0.29  2.05  -2.53  5.86 11784 -0.21  1.90 -2.53 5.84 11597 -0.05  1.97 -2.53 6.35 
Average wealth index for cluster 
6034 -0.37  1.75  -2.51  4.47 11784 -0.26  1.61 -2.50 3.99 11597 -0.04  1.62 -2.37 4.41 
Urban  6049 0.34  0.47  0.00  1.00 11852 0.32  0.47  0.00 1.00 11651 0.35  0.48 0.00 1.00 
# schools per pop in school age  6014 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02 11822 0.01  0.00  0.00 0.04 11585 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.04 
# Classes per pop in school age  6014 0.02  0.01  0.00  0.18 11852 0.02  0.02  0.00 0.28 11651 0.02  0.02 0.00 0.28 
# of teachers per pop in school age  6014 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.18 11852 0.02  0.02  0.00 0.31 11651 0.02  0.02 0.00 0.31 
# of trained teachers per pop in 
school age  6014 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 11852 0.00  0.01  0.00 0.09 11651 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.09 
Log(Average annual fees)  6049 6.02  0.96  4.13  7.59 11852 5.95  0.90  0.00 7.75 11651 5.97  0.90 0.00 7.71 
Travel time to the closest school  6049  17.81  54.51  0.00  360.00  11852  7.18  34.86  0.00  420.00                
Source: Author's calculations using DHS data merged with 2003 school census data.  33
 
 













Drinking water from pump/well  0.02 
Drinking water from 
spring,river,lake,dam,rain -0.29 
Drinking water from other source  0.17 
Flush toilet  0.21 
Pit toilet  0.24 
No toilet  -0.34 
Electricity 0.39 
Finished floors  0.33 
% of variance explained  29.63% 
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Table A.5: Determinants of School Attendance – Rural Sample 
   Dependent variable: School attendance 
Gender (1=male)  -0.015  -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Age    0.119 0.119 0.119 0.118 0.120 0.119 
  (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
Age squared  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Both  parents  at  home  0.090 0.091 0.091 0.090 0.091 0.090 
  (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
Maximum years of education 
completed in the HH 
0.019 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
# of household members  -0.014  -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Wealth  index  0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Wealth  index  0.034 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.040 0.035 
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
Average  annual  fees        -0.004 
        ( 0 . 0 0 9 )  
# of trained teachers per pop in 
school age 
     -5.145   
     (1.551)***   
# of teachers per pop in school 
age 
    1.319    
    (1.041)    
# Classes per pop in school age      1.016       
     (0.939)     
# schools per pop in school age    5.130         
   (3.431)        
year==    2000.0000  0.073 0.066 0.069 0.069 0.074 0.073 
  (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** 
year==    2005.0000  0.060 0.052 0.056 0.056 0.058 0.059 
  (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** 
Observations  16858 16823 16823 16823 16823 16858 
Pseudo  R-sq  0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Robust standard errors clustered at the cluster level in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A.6: Determinants of School Attendance – Urban Sample 
 
   Dependent variable: School attendance 
Gender  (1=male)  0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016  0.016 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***  (0.005)*** 
Age    0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035  0.035 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***  (0.008)*** 
Age squared  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Both  parents  at  home  0.094 0.096 0.094 0.094 0.093  0.094 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***  (0.008)*** 
Maximum years of education 
completed in the HH 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007  0.007 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
# of household members  -0.003  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Wealth  index  0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014  0.014 
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
Average wealth index for cluster  -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013  -0.010 
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)** 
Average  annual  fees        -0.006 
        ( 0 . 0 0 9 )  
# of trained teachers per pop in 
school age 
     -0.269   
     ( 0 . 2 1 0 )    
# of teachers per pop in school 
age 
    0.050     
    (0.076)     
# Classes per pop in school age      0.071       
     (0.084)      
# schools per pop in school age    0.600         
   (0.582)        
year==    2000.0000  0.033 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.033  0.031 
  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***  (0.008)*** 
year==    2005.0000  0.058 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.058  0.056 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***  (0.008)*** 
Observations  10143 10048 10143 10143 10143  10143 
Pseudo  R-sq  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08  0.08 
Robust standard errors clustered at the cluster level in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A.7: Descriptive Statistics – School Fees Determinants 
 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Log(monthly fees charged)  13656  5.90  1.25  0.00  10.53 
=1 The school has electricity  13673  0.24  0.43  0.00  1.00 
=1 The school has a sports field  13632  0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00 
=1 The school has library  13535  0.12  0.32  0.00  1.00 
=1 The school has recreation fields  13738  0.78  0.42  0.00  1.00 
=1 The school has Salons de Toilettes  13983  0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00 
=1 The school has office for the principal  13521  0.41  0.49  0.00  1.00 
=1 The school has Cuisine  13983  0.18  0.38  0.00  1.00 
=1 The school has latrine  13983  0.73  0.45  0.00  1.00 
Class size - # students per class  13897  31.17  20.50  0.00  377.00 
# of offices per teacher  13757 0.30  0.49 0.00 7.00 
# of tables per teacher  13746 0.67  0.71 0.00 8.00 
# of chairs per teacher  13747 0.66  0.74  0.00 10.00 
Has  preschool  13896  0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Number  of  shifts  13896  1.03 0.17 1.00 2.00 
Management  committee?  13837  0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Parent  committee?  13911  0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
=1 if the school has a license  13983  0.08  0.26  0.00  1.00 
School is managed by independent and secular groups  13983  0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
School is managed by community groups  13983  0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
School is managed by religious groups  13983  0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Teacher-student ratio  13896 0.05  0.04  0.00 1.00 
% of teachers trained (vs. hired) 12524  0.11  0.25 0.00 1.00 
log(# of students in the section communale) 13983  8.56  1.43  2.08  11.74 
Adjusted  Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index  13974  0.03 0.03 0.00 0.52 
Square of the share of the local market owned by 
the  school  13897  0.01 0.03 0.00 1.00 
Source:Authors’ analysis of 2003 school census.   37
Table A. 8: Determinants of School Fees 
  Dependent var.: log(average school fees) 
 Independent  Community  Religious 
School infrastructure      
Chow test for difference in coefficients  F( 24,   260) =  2.87      Prob > F = 0.0000 
=1 The school has libraries  0.220  -0.051  0.027 
 (0.046)***  (0.115)  (0.043) 
=1 The school has an office for the principal  0.209  0.181  0.142 
(0.036)*** (0.063)***  (0.032)*** 
# of offices per teacher 0.077  -0.070 0.045 
 (0.038)**  (0.050)  (0.034) 
# of tables per teacher  0.148  0.235  0.150 
 (0.032)***  (0.060)***  (0.026)*** 
# of chairs per teacher  0.071  0.153  0.091 
 (0.030)**  (0.061)**  (0.023)*** 
Class size - # students per class  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)*** 
=1 The school has kitchen  0.025  -0.033  0.077 
 (0.049)  (0.086)  (0.032)** 
=1 The school has electricity  0.186  0.465  0.114 
 (0.058)***  (0.116)***  (0.045)** 
=1 The school has latrine  0.166  0.122  0.146 
 (0.050)***  (0.062)*  (0.043)*** 
=1 The school has bathrooms 
 
0.150 0.286  0.191 
(0.037)*** (0.099)***  (0.043)*** 
=1 The school has sports areas  0.048  0.049  0.053 
 (0.046)  (0.085)  (0.057) 
=1 The school has recreation areas 
  
-0.013 -0.149  0.034 
(0.031) (0.076)*  (0.037) 
School administrative quality      
Chow test for difference in coefficients  F( 10,   260) = 2.21          Prob > F = 0.0178 
=1 Has preschool  0.054  0.065  -0.003 
 (0.045)  (0.073)  (0.036) 
Number of shifts available  -0.118  -0.012  0.005 
 (0.082)  (0.165)  (0.083) 
=1 Management committee  0.022  0.125  0.142 
 (0.033)  (0.067)*  (0.033)*** 
=1 Parent committee  -0.040  0.054  0.010 
 (0.042)  (0.062)  (0.034) 
=1 if the school has a license  0.224  0.336  0.281 
 (0.052)***  (0.134)**  (0.065)*** 
Teachers' characteristics      
Chow test for difference in coefficients  F( 4,   260) =2.16           Prob > F=0.0734 
Teacher-student ratio  -0.256 -1.387 0.223 
 (0.556)  (0.879)  (0.415) 
% of teachers trained (vs. hired) 0.378  0.269 0.236 
   (0.054)***  (0.182)  (0.059)*** 
Market size and concentration measures      
Chow test for difference in coefficients  F(  6,   260) = 1.19            Prob > F = 0.3142 
log(# of students in the section communale) 0.091  0.002  0.135 
(0.079) (0.065) (0.045)*** 
Adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
-0.723 -0.610  0.300 
(0.775) (0.999)  (0.718) 
Square of the share of the local market owned 
by the school 
0.575 1.518  1.294 
(0.930) (1.103) (0.646)** 
Constant 5.110  5.098  4.176 
 (0.709)***  (0.593)***  (0.421)*** 
Commune/urban dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Chow test for difference in coefficients  F( 44,   260) =   14.02            Prob > F =  0.0000 
Observations 3509  1883  5964 
Number of group(commune urban)  240  203  257 
R-squared (overall)  0.51  0.25  0.33 
R-squared (within)  0.18  0.14  0.12 
R-squared (between)  0.45  0.21  0.36 
 0.43 0.44  0.32 
Robust standard errors clustered at the commune/urban level in parentheses.* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1% 
 
 